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From Vietnam to Kazakhstan: How realistic is to build Non-Chinese Tungsten Hubs Before 2050

  • Storozhuk
  • 3 days ago
  • 10 min read

Strategy, M&A, Finance | PhD | Metals & Mining

November 14, 2025


Tungsten is a small market in dollar terms (just around $5B), but a critical backbone for defense, aerospace, tooling, mining, electronics and energy. It also happens to be one of the most China-centric commodity chains in the world.


1/ Tungsten’s role today and demand for tungsten to 2030–2050.

Tungsten combines highest melting point of any metal (~3,420°C), very high density (~19.3 g/cm³, comparable to gold), extreme hardness and wear resistance (especially as tungsten carbide). 

These properties make it non-substitutable in many areas, such as: Cemented carbide tools and mining bits, High-temperature aerospace & turbine components. Armor-piercing cores and high-density defense parts, Electrical contacts, X-ray targets, semiconductor & PV equipment. 

The estimates give that the global tungsten market was about $4.7–5.6B in 2023–2024 (with forecast CAGR ~5–8% to $9–9.7B by 2030–2033). On a volume basis, USGS & Argus put world tungsten consumption at 80+ kt pa W (metal), while some broader “tungsten product” studies estimate ~119–126 kt pa in 2022–2023 rising to ~170–176 kt pa by 2030. 

By geography (contained W) the consumption of tungsten products comes from China – around 66% to 75% of world use, i.e. ~55–60 kt pa W, while the rest of world takes ~20–25 kt pa W  – mainly EU, US, Japan, South Korea and India.

Tungsten is used for cemented carbides: cutting & drilling tools, wear parts (around 65%), steels and superalloys (around 14%), tungsten metal products: powders, heavy alloys, wire (around 12%) and chemicals and other uses (around 9%).

Upside risk for the growth of tungsten consumption comes from: defense & aerospace spending, mining and infrastructure cycles, automation, EVs and advanced manufacturing (tooling intensity).


2/ Global reserves & mine production – and where non - Chinese players stand

World tungsten reserves (2024) are more than 4.6 Mt W with China owning 2.4 Mt W (or ~52% of world reserves). Key non - Chinese holders are: 


  1. Australia: ~570 kt W (~13% of global reserves)

  2. Russia: 400 kt W (~9%)

  3. Vietnam: 140 kt W (~3%)

  4. Spain, Portugal, Austria (EU): combined ~79 kt W (~1–2% of world reserves)


On top of this:

  1. Canada's Mactung deposit: updated resource are about 41.5 Mt at 0.73% WO₃ + 12.2 Mt at 0.59% WO₃, making it one of the largest high-grade deposits globally.

  2. Kazakhstan: national geological assessments quote ≈2 Mt of WO₃ in the country, with JORC-compliant resources of ≈1.4 Mt WO₃ (≈410 kt at JORC “reserve” level) at Upper Kairakty + North Katpar alone. If fully counted as reserves, this would represent a very significant single-country share of global tungsten resources.


Mine production (2024, contained W): World total: ~81 kt pa W, with China holding 67 kt (or ~83% of global mine output). Key non - Chinese producers (2024): 


  1. Vietnam: 3.4 kt – the world’s 2nd largest producer, almost entirely from Nui Phao (Masan High-Tech Materials). 

  2. Russia: 2 kt.

  3. EU (Austria, Portugal, Spain): Austria 800 t, Portugal 500 t, Spain 700 t , so totally ~2 kt combined.

  4. Australia: 1 kt (Mt Carbine, Dolphin ramping up).

  5. Africa: Rwanda 1.2 kt, plus smaller volumes from other African states (with Africa as a whole around 1.5–2 kt).

  6. South America: Bolivia 1.6 kt, making it the dominant South American producer.


There are more developing tungsten mining projects in Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan, as well as in Russia, Rwanda and South America, but no single non - Chinese player is yet above ~4 kt per year in contained W.


3/ The core Chinese players are the engine of global tungsten

A few Chinese groups anchor the entire global tungsten system - they are the price setters and the “last resort” suppliers for most of the world.:

1) Xiamen Tungsten Co., Ltd: Diversified across tungsten, molybdenum, REEs and new energy materials. its market cap for the end of 2024 was around $7-8B; tungsten & molybdenum segment profit alone exceeded $350M.

2) China Tungsten & Hightech Materials Co., Ltd: is fully integrated (mines, concentrates production, APT, oxides, powders, carbides production, cemented carbides and tools production). Holds around 1.23 Mt W resources across tungsten, molybdenum, bismuth. Its tungsten production capacity on the order of ≈20 kt pa W-equivalent, plus ≈3 million tungsten tool units annually.

3) Zhuzhou Cemented Carbide Group (ZCC) – China Minmetals: is one of the world’s largest cemented carbide producers, with more than 10 kt pa combined APT, tungsten and carbide powder production capacity and ~5 kt pa of cemented carbides.

4) Minmetals tungsten cluster: is a dense network of APT plants, ferrotungsten and advanced tungsten products in Hunan, Jiangxi and surrounding regions of China, coordinated at group level. This cluster sits on the majority of Chinese tungsten reserves and mining quotas and on a huge share of global APT, oxide, powder and carbide capacity.


4/ How dependent is the world on China – and what do the new hubs actually produce?

So, China produces ~80-83% of global mine output and tungsten concentrate production outside China (including Vietnam, Russia, Europe, Australia, Africa, South America) – is only ~17-20% of world total, according to USGS. 

Midstream choke point (APT, powders, carbides): Industry estimates give that China accounts for more than 80% of global APT output, more than 80% of global output of tungsten oxides and powders, and 60–70% of global tungsten carbide feedstock. When China tightened export controls on APT and WO₃ in 2025, APT exports fell ~40%+ YoY and WO₃ exports ~70%+, with immediate price spikes for European buyers.


Chinese overseas tungsten footprint (outside China): 

1) Kazakhstan – Bokuta (Bakuta) by Jiaxin International / Jiangxi Copper: 109.5M t ore @ 0.21% WO₃ with a potential output of about 3–4 kt pa W is able to strengthen China’s upstream security outside quota system.

2) Laos – Chinese-owned tungsten mines: Multiple Yunnan/Guangdong groups redirecting all concentrate flows to China.

3) Rwanda – Africa’s main producer ships 0.8-1 kt pa W to China via Chinese traders

4) Bolivia – South America’s leader: Majority of its 1.6 kt pa W shipped to China

5) Afghanistan: Ongoing discussions between Chinese consortiums and Taliban government on large resources in Salang belt.

China is actively securing upstream assets globally while dominating midstream at home.

It is possible to highlight the following Non-Chinese hubs with their approximate production volumes and their focus:


  1. Vietnam with Nui Phao/Masan High-Tech Materials: Mine output: ≈3.4 kt pa W (2024), almost all of Vietnam’s production (historically, Nui Phao did produce more than 5kt pa W in concentrate). Specialization of the hub is integrated APT, oxides, powders, carbides; and it is the largest non - Chinese tungsten chemicals complex.

  2. Iberia & Austria – EU hard-metals base: Austria: 800 t W; Portugal: 500 t; Spain: 700 t in 2024 (together around 2 kt W combined). Plansee/Wolfram and GTP link these mines into European powder & carbide plants; total EU ore share still only ~2–3% of world mine output but strategically important for EU market.

  3. Australia – Mt Carbine, Dolphin & pipeline: 2024 production: 1 kt W with around $2B ongoing capex pipeline across 12 tungsten projects in Australia alone with its focus on low-risk concentrate for Japan, South Korea, US, EU, with potential APT/powder plants.

  4. North America – Mactung & early-stage US projects: Mactung’s resource supports planned production on the order of several kt pa WO₃ per year (historical FS suggests ~750,000 MTU WO₃/year ≈ 6,000 t WO₃ ≈ 4,700 t W in early years). Its focus is the DoD-driven, security-of-supply tons, not bulk market share.

  5. Central Asia – Kazakhstan-centered hub: Besides Bokuta (Bakuta) project controlled by Chinese companies, there is Upper Kairakty + North Katpar deposits with JORC resources: 1.4 million t WO₃, ~410 kt classified as JORC “reserves”. Tau-Ken Samruk + US-backed investors agreed to target ≈12 kt W-equivalent concentrate per year once fully ramped, plus local APT production in Kazakhstan. 

  6. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan host additional tin–tungsten and tungsten deposits that can feed the hub. Central Asia already has metallurgical expertise and industrial zones (Uzbekistan’s steel and alloys base, Kazakhstan’s chemical/metallurgical plants), which can host APT and, later, powder/carbide facilities.

  7. South Korea – Sangdong: Sangdong is being redeveloped by Almonty with a goal of several kt pa W concentrate, tied to US and allied defense/tooling customers under offtake contracts. 


Even with these hubs, well over half of non - Chinese mine output still flows to Chinese refineries, and a majority (likely 60–80%) of non - Chinese tungsten consumption is ultimately satisfied by Chinese APT, powders or carbides.


5/ Technology & economics – is de-risking from China realistic?

Technologically: yes. The process chain is mature and widely understood:


  1. Ore (typically 0.2–1.0% WO₃) → concentrate (50–70% WO₃)

  2. Concentrate → APT via hydrometallurgy

  3. APT → WO₃ → W powder via hydrogen reduction

  4. W powder → WC, ferrotungsten, heavy alloys

  5. Cemented carbides & components for end-users


Dozens of plants outside China already do parts of this.

However, strategically, China has a 40-year head start: China deliberately treated tungsten as a strategic asset from the 1980s, using low-cost supply and export surges to drive competitors out, then quotas and environmental rules to control volume and price, and progressive integration up the value chain into powders, carbides, tools and high-tech products.

Realistically, to reduce dependence on China means: 


  • multi-billion USD CAPEX globally for new mines in Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia, Africa, multiple APT plants in Europe, Vietnam, Central Asia, North America, powder & carbide plants, expanded scrap recycling in EU, US, Japan, Korea.

  • Time: at least 10–15 years of sustained policy & offtake support (permits + construction + ramp-up).

  • Cost: non-Chinese operating costs will often be higher than China’s cluster economics, so long-term offtake contracts (defense, aerospace, OEMs) are critical.


It is possible to build a robust non - Chinese tungsten chain, but it is not cheap, and it will take some time to do that.


6/ Regional roles – Vietnam, Central Asia, North America, Iberia/Austria… and Africa, Russia, South America


  1.  Vietnam – integrated non-Chinese Asia hub with a strategic role of Asian alternative for APT & powders, increasingly used by Japanese, Korean, European and US customers. Its Nui Phao (Masan High-Tech Materials) provides ≈3.4 kt pa W and anchors one of the largest non-Chinese tungsten chemical complexes, producing APT, oxides, powders and carbides.

  2. Central Asia – Kazakhstan-centered cluster has a potential for being a regional ore + APT hub, with some downstream powders/carbides linked to existing metallurgical infrastructure in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan’s tungsten reserves and APT production in-country explicitly may position the hud as a significant non-Chinese supply source for US/EU/Turkey/MENA as well as a Chinese supply source. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan can contribute additional feed via smaller tin–tungsten and tungsten deposits.

  3. North America – strategic, DoD-driven hub: Mactung is one of the largest and highest-grade tungsten deposits globally, with updated resources 41.5 Mt @ 0.73% WO₃ (Indicated) + 12.2 Mt @ 0.59% (Inferred). The hub is backed by US–Canadian funding and DoD interest, its role is to secure “China-free” tons for defense, aerospace, and high-end tooling.

  4. Iberian & Austrian hub – EU industrial base: Spain (Barruecopardo), Portugal (Panasqueira), Austria (Mittersill) together produce 2 kt pa W, feeding Plansee, GTP and other EU powder/carbide plants. Under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, this hub is a natural anchor for European hard-metals and high-performance alloys, supported by long-term contracts with non-EU miners (Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia).

  5. Africa – niche, but high-leverage supplier: Rwanda (1.2 kt pa W) is the main African producer; additional smaller outputs from other states make Africa a ~1.5–2 kt W/year contributor. Much of the concentrate historically flowed via Chinese traders and refiners; newer contracts aim to route portions to European and Asian non-Chinese processors. Its role is incremental, but important for diversifying non-Chinese feedstock and supporting local development.

  6. Russia – mid-sized exporter under sanctions shadow with ~400 kt W reserves (~9% of world) and 2 kt W/year mine production (Russia is a top-5 producer and significant reserve holder). Historically exported concentrate and intermediate products to Europe and China; sanctions and tariff regimes are pushing Western buyers to phase out Russian tungsten from sensitive supply chains (defense in particular) and making Russia to lean on China as main customer.

  7. South America – Bolivian tonnage: Bolivia produces around 1.6 kt pa W, making it the main South American tungsten source, much of this flows to Chinese and European buyers. Bolivia can remain a relevant non-Chinese ore supplier.


Summary: A Small Market With Outsized Strategic Consequences

Tungsten sits at the intersection of national security, industrial competitiveness, and geopolitical leverage. Although the market is small (measured in only $5B annually), it underpins capabilities that no modern economy or defense ecosystem can function without cutting tools, aerospace components, energy systems, high-temperature alloys, and advanced electronics.

China’s near-total dominance across the value chain (from reserves and mining to APT, powders, carbides, and tools) creates a structural dependency unmatched in almost any other critical mineral. China is also expanding upstream globally (Kazakhstan’s Bokuta, Laos, Rwanda, Bolivia, Afghanistan), tightening control even beyond its borders.

New non-Chinese hubs in Vietnam, Central Asia, North America, Australia and the EU are emerging - but most of the world still relies on Chinese midstream capacity.

The path to diversification is technically feasible but strategically demanding: it will require multi-billion-dollar investments, long-term offtake commitments, and a decade or more of sustained policy focus from the US, EU, Japan, Korea, and key regional partners. Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and Canada may become the cornerstones of a more balanced global system, but they will need coordinated support to compete with China’s 40-year head start.

The conclusion is clear: the global tungsten ecosystem is shifting, but it is not yet shifting fast enough. The next decade will determine whether the world remains structurally dependent on a single supplier - or whether diversified, resilient, and strategically aligned supply chains can finally take shape.


Global Tungsten Supply Chain Comparison:

Segment China Non-China World

1) Share of global reserves ~52% (2.4 Mt W) ~48% (Australia, Russia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, EU, Africa)

2) Mine production (2024) 67 kt (83%) 14 kt (17%)

3) APT production >80% of global output <20% (mainly Vietnam & Austria/Plansee)

4) Oxides production >80% <20%

5) Powder production ~80% ~20% (Vietnam, EU)

6) Carbide feedstock 60–70% ~30–40%

7) Finished carbides & tools largest exporter globally EU (Plansee, GTP), Korea, Japan – but large input still Chinese

8) Industrial strategy 40 years of integrated, Rebuilding; fragmented; early- state-supported cluster stage

9) Comparative costs lowest cost (cluster effect) higher CAPEX & OPEX

10) Offtake structure Domestic/export Needs long-term offtake dominance (OEM, defense)

11) Future expansion Moderate Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Canada, (controlled by quotas) Australia, EU





 
 
 

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