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Aluminum in 2026: Why the Value Is Moving from Metal to Competitive Capacity

Storozhuk
Aug 17
16 min read

Strategy, M&A, Finance | PhD | Metals & Mining

August 17, 2026


Global earnings are strong, but the deeper story is a re-rating of scarce, powered and market-accessible aluminum capacity across the Gulf, North America, Europe, China and Asia.


Core thesis.

The most important change in aluminum is not simply that prices and earnings are strong. The unit of strategic value is shifting from a tonne of nominal capacity to a tonne of competitive capacity: powered, permitted, low-cost, carbon-acceptable, logistically resilient and located in a market able to pay an attractive regional premium.


Executive summary

The first half of 2026 has produced unusually strong economics across large parts of the global aluminum chain:

· Alcoa, Rio Tinto, Hydro, EGA, Alba and Century have all benefited from some combination of higher aluminum prices, elevated physical premiums, lower alumina costs, production restarts and constrained regional supply.

· High-value downstream companies such as Constellium, Kaiser Aluminum and Novelis have also reported strong results, although their economics must be analyzed on conversion revenue, product mix and EBITDA per tonne rather than compared directly with primary smelters.

The correct conclusion is not that every aluminum producer is earning structurally sustainable record margins. Part of the 2026 outcome is cyclical and geopolitical: Middle East disruption drove regional premiums sharply higher, especially in the United States, while alumina moved into oversupply. Yet the strategic reaction of companies and governments points to something more durable. Existing smelters are being restarted, governments are underwriting power solutions to preserve capacity, and strategic buyers are paying billions for operating assets that would be extraordinarily difficult to recreate.

The global supply response is also changing: China remains the dominant producer, but its approximately 45 Mt primary-capacity framework limits a repeat of the unconstrained expansion seen in the 2010s. That does not make China irrelevant: utilization, technology, relocation toward lower-carbon power and semi-fabricated exports remain powerful balancing mechanisms. Indonesia and India are therefore the most important incremental supply variables for the late 2020s.

The key investment question is no longer simply 'Where will LME aluminum trade next quarter?' It is 'Who owns the best tonnes of capacity, and what are those tonnes worth under different regional, power, carbon and raw-material scenarios?'

This report therefore moves beyond a market-balance discussion toward an asset-economics and replacement-cost framework.

 

Comparability notes:

1.      Financial comparisons use H1 2026 versus H1 2025 wherever calendar half-year data are available.

2.      Quarterly data are aggregated only where the accounting basis is additive; Hindalco and Novelis are shown on their June-quarter fiscal reporting basis, and Rusal uses FY2025 because H1 2026 had not been released as of August 17.

3.      Non-dollar figures include indicative U.S.-dollar equivalents.


1. A strong 1H’2026 across the global aluminum value chain

Company

Model

Period

Revenue

Profitability

Volume / operating datapoint

Comment

Alcoa

Integrated alumina + primary

H1 2026

$7.159bn sales

$1.496bn adj. EBITDA excl. special items*

1.243 Mt primary production

*Q1 $595m + Q2 $901m

Rio Tinto Aluminium

Integrated bauxite + alumina + primary

H1 2026

$9.401bn segment revenue

$3.093bn underlying EBITDA

Strong Canadian/Australian portfolio

EBITDA +31% YoY

Hydro Aluminium Metal

Primary + casthouse

H1 2026

—

NOK11.455bn (~$1.14bn) adj. EBITDA

Q1 NOK5.034bn + Q2 NOK6.421bn

Vs NOK4.969bn H1 2025

EGA

Integrated primary + alumina + recycling

H1 2026

AED13.544bn ($3.688bn) revenue

~$1.23bn adj. EBITDA

1.006 Mt cast metal

33.3% adj. EBITDA margin

Alba

Primary + casthouse

H1 2026

Reported in BHD

~$373m attributable profit

Gulf production disrupted in Q2

Profit +228% YoY

Century Aluminum

Primary

H1 2026

$1.401bn sales

$558.3m adj. EBITDA

253.5 kt shipments

 

Constellium

Downstream

H1 2026

$5.2bn revenue

$798m adj. EBITDA

751 kt shipments

Includes $226m positive non-cash metal lag

Kaiser Aluminum

High-value downstream

Q2 focus

$437m conversion revenue

$166m adj. EBITDA

—

38.1% margin on conversion revenue

Hindalco consolidated

Integrated + Novelis

Q1 FY27 (Jun-26)

company reported +32% YoY

₹149.89bn (~$1.59bn) EBITDA

India aluminum + Novelis all record EBITDA

Not H1 comparable

(Incl. Novelis)

Rolling + recycling

Q1 FY27 (Jun-26)

$5.8bn net sales

$516m adj. EBITDA

916 kt rolled shipments

100%-owned Hindalco subsidiary

Rusal

Integrated primary + alumina

FY2025 latest full financial period

$14.81bn revenue

FY2025 pressured by costs/FX/finance

~4.49 Mt aluminum sales

H1 2026 not yet published

  The table is intentionally not ranked by margin. Primary smelters, integrated producers and downstream rolling companies recognize metal differently. The relevant investor metric changes by peer group: EBITDA/t and metal-alumina-power spread for primary producers; conversion revenue, EBITDA/t and end-market mix for downstream companies; integrated cash generation and internal raw-material transfer economics for vertically integrated groups.



2. The profit pool is shifting toward smelting

The 2026 aluminum cycle is best understood through the smelting spread rather than the headline LME price:

LME + regional premium + value-added product premium – alumina – power – carbon/anodes – conversion cost = smelting margin

Hydro provides the cleanest demonstration. Aluminium Metal adjusted EBITDA was NOK5.034bn in Q1 and NOK6.421bn in Q2, or NOK11.455bn (~$1.14bn) for 1H’2026. In contrast, Bauxite & Alumina adjusted EBITDA fell sharply as alumina prices weakened. The same direction is visible inside China Hongqiao: aluminum-alloy margins strengthened while alumina margins compressed.

Alcoa shows a similar operational leverage: 1H’2026 sales were $7.159bn, adjusted EBITDA excluding special items totaled approximately $1.496bn. Primary aluminum production totaled 1.243 Mt. The key driver was not simply LME: Q2 benefited from higher shipments, product premiums, completed restarts and favorable alumina costs, while U.S. tariff costs partly offset the gain.

This distinction is essential for the medium-term thesis. If LME normalizes while alumina remains soft and regional premiums stay elevated, certain smelters can retain strong cash economics even without a continuously rising benchmark price.

 

The company results become more informative when viewed geographically. The same aluminum price produces different economics depending on power, regional premiums, logistics and market access. The Gulf is the logical starting point because it combines some of the industry's lowest-cost modern smelting capacity with the clearest new evidence of concentration risk.

3. The Gulf: exceptional economics meet a new concentration risk

The Gulf remains one of the world's most competitive primary-aluminum clusters: EGA, Alba, Ma'aden, Qatalum and Sohar combine modern potlines, port infrastructure, scale and historically attractive power economics. But 2026 proved that geographic concentration has a price: disruption around the Strait of Hormuz affected production, shipping and raw-material flows.

EGA's 1H'2026 result is the strongest evidence of scarcity economics: revenue fell to $3.688bn from $4.106bn because production and sales dropped sharply, yet adjusted EBITDA increased and margin expanded to 33.3%. Cast-metal production fell to 1.006 Mt from 1.420 Mt, while average H1 LME aluminum rose to $3,382/t from $2,538/t. More strikingly, the U.S. Midwest premium averaged around $2,405/t versus $857/t a year earlier.

That is why the Gulf assets should no longer be valued only as low-cost smelters. Their strategic value now includes route-to-market resilience, spare inventory, alternative ports and the ability to shift product geographically. The same episode also shows why the Gulf exposure is not risk-free even when power economics are excellent.


If the Gulf shows the value of low-cost production, North America shows the value of location. The United States is structurally short primary metal, so tariffs and the Midwest premium can create economics that bear little resemblance to the headline LME price.

4. North America: where regional scarcity is most visible

The United States is structurally short primary metal and increasingly willing to use tariffs and industrial policy to support domestic capacity. The relevant economic price is therefore not LME alone but LME plus Midwest premium plus product premium, net of tariff and logistics effects.

Century is the clearest listed pure-play: 2Q’2026 adjusted EBITDA attributable to Century reached $326.9m, up $95.5m sequentially. It gives approximately $558m for H1, on roughly $1.40bn of sales and 253.5kt of shipments. That is an extraordinary earnings outcome, but it is highly sensitive to realized regional premiums and should not be extrapolated mechanically into a mid-cycle number.

Alcoa is more diversified and therefore a better test of integrated economics. Its H1 aluminum segment EBITDA is approximated at $1.767bn. Q2 production rose to 636kt as San Ciprián, Alumar, Lista and Portland restarts advanced.

  Downstream leaders show a different source of value: Kaiser reported $166m of Q2 adjusted EBITDA on $437m of conversion revenue, while Constellium reported H1 adjusted EBITDA of $798m on $5.2bn revenue. Constellium's number includes a $226m positive non-cash metal-price-lag impact, which is precisely why downstream results need to be normalized before using headline EBITDA in valuation.

 

Europe presents the opposite configuration: strong strategic demand for aluminum, but a structurally difficult power environment. This makes existing low-carbon or power-secured smelters unusually difficult to replace.

5. Europe: power security is becoming part of asset value

Europe is where the distinction between nominal capacity and competitive capacity is most obvious: high electricity costs have destroyed or curtailed smelting economics at multiple sites, while CBAM and low-carbon purchasing standards are increasing the value of hydro- or nuclear-linked production.

Hydro's Norwegian system illustrates the advantaged side of Europe: long-duration power sourcing, low-carbon metal, value-added casthouse products and growing recycling. Slovalco's 75ktpa restart illustrates the opposite side: mothballed European capacity can return only when the policy and power framework becomes economic.

 

 

Two recent cases make this replacement-cost argument tangible. One is a government-backed effort to preserve an existing smelter; the other is a strategic acquisition of scarce European capacity.

6. Preserving scarce capacity: from Tomago to Dunkerque

Tomago (1) is Australia's largest aluminum smelter, located in New South Wales near Newcastle. It can produce up to 590ktpa and has operated since 1983. Ownership is Rio Tinto 51.55%, Gove Aluminium Finance 36.05% and Hydro Aluminium 12.40%.

Its strategic problem is power. Tomago's current coal-linked electricity contract expires at the end of 2028, and Rio had warned that the smelter could close without a commercially viable replacement.

In August 2026, Australia's federal and New South Wales governments agreed a A$2.5bn support package, approximately $1.76bn, to secure the smelter beyond 2028 and support a 10-year power arrangement. Tomago itself will invest at least A$1.1bn (approximately $0.78bn), through 2038, including A$100m for decarbonization. The target is 100% renewable electricity by 2033.

For valuation, this is critical evidence. The government is effectively recognizing that the economic cost of losing a 590ktpa strategic smelter - jobs, grid demand, manufacturing capability and replacement difficulty - can exceed the cost of underwriting its transition. Tomago is therefore one of the strongest real-world examples of the replacement-cost thesis.

 

Aluminium Dunkerque (2) is therefore more than a 300ktpa French smelter. It is the EU's largest primary aluminum smelter, embedded in a premium regional market. Alba agreed on June 2, 2026 to acquire 100% in a transaction valued at approximately $2.2bn; Bpifrance is expected to invest €100m (about $116m at announcement FX) for a 6% stake. The transaction is expected to be financed by a banking consortium. A simple headline value of roughly $7,300 per annual tonne of smelting capacity is not a clean EV/capacity multiple because the transaction structure and liabilities matter, but it gives a useful sense of how much strategic capital is being committed to scarce European capacity.

 

The same logic extends beyond individual smelters. Rather than build an entirely new integrated aluminum chain, major producers are also acquiring operating systems that already combine resources, refining, smelting, infrastructure and customers.

7. Consolidating the installed base: Alcoa–South32

Alcoa’s South32 transaction is another expression of this consolidation logic. In June 2026 Alcoa announced an upfront consideration of approximately $4.1bn, consisting of $3.1bn cash and roughly $1.0bn of Alcoa shares. In addition, the structure included up to $750m of contingent consideration linked to future alumina and aluminum prices. Including net debt and lease liabilities, public disclosures describe implied enterprise value of up to approximately $5.6bn; Alcoa also assumed significant rehabilitation obligations.

The portfolio includes South32's 86% interest in Worsley Alumina in Western Australia, 100% of Hillside Aluminium in South Africa, a 33% interest in Brazil's MRN bauxite mine (subject to pre-emption mechanics), and interests in the Alumar refinery and smelter in Brazil (Mozal in Mozambique is excluded).

  The strategic logic is more important than the headline price: Alcoa is buying integration, scale and operating assets in jurisdictions where reproducing bauxite-to-metal infrastructure would take years. South32, conversely, is exiting a capital-intensive aluminum system to concentrate more heavily on copper and other base metals. The same asset can therefore rationally have different strategic value to buyer and seller.

 

Not all value creation sits in primary metal. Hindalco illustrates a different model: low-cost integrated upstream exposure in India combined with a global downstream and recycling franchise through Novelis.

8. India and the downstream model: Hindalco and Novelis

  Novelis sits fully inside the Hindalco group as a wholly owned subsidiary. Hindalco acquired 100% of Novelis in 2007 through its subsidiaries and the correct way to understand Hindalco is therefore as two large aluminum systems under one parent: an integrated Indian bauxite–alumina–primary–downstream business, and Novelis, a global rolled-products and recycling platform.

The latest June 2026 quarter reinforces that distinction. Hindalco reported consolidated EBITDA of ₹149.89bn, approximately $1.59bn at the June 30 reference FX rate, up 73% year-on-year. Management said Aluminium Upstream, Aluminium Downstream, Copper and Novelis each delivered record quarterly EBITDA. Novelis separately reported $5.8bn of net sales, $516m of adjusted EBITDA and 916kt of rolled shipments for the same June quarter.

Novelis’ downstream evolution

Novelis' withdrawal from much of the European household/packaging foil footprint is not new: in 2012 it sold foil and packaging plants in Rugles, Dudelange and Berlin as part of a deliberate shift toward premium rolled products. That history is relevant because the company has subsequently concentrated capital on higher-scale and higher-value downstream categories rather than attempting to remain broad across every flat-rolled niche.

Today the strategic direction is visible in major investments in beverage can sheet, automotive sheet, recycling and the new Bay Minette rolling/recycling complex in Alabama, while Hindalco's Indian downstream program is simultaneously scaling a 170ktpa flat-rolled facility at Aditya, a Chakan battery-enclosure facility and battery-foil production. The appropriate conclusion is not that the group 'left foil' altogether — Hindalco itself is expanding battery foil — but that Novelis exited selected commodity foil assets and redeployed toward larger premium rolled and recycling franchises.


These Western, Gulf and Indian developments still sit inside a market dominated by China. The 45 Mt capacity framework changes the form of China's supply response, but not its importance.

9. China: a capacity ceiling, but still the market’s principal balancing force

China remains close to 60% of global primary aluminum production. The approximate 45 Mt national primary-capacity framework makes the next cycle structurally different from the 2010s, but it does not eliminate China's ability to rebalance the market.

·  Utilization can remain extremely high when spreads are attractive.

·  Capacity can migrate toward Yunnan and other regions with lower-carbon or more competitive power.

·  Technology and larger-amperage cells can reduce electricity intensity and raise effective productivity.

·  Exports of semi-fabricated aluminum can transmit Chinese supply into global downstream markets without appearing as primary-metal exports.

China Hongqiao and Chalco therefore belong in the core global peer set, not an appendix. Hongqiao's integrated model combines alumina, primary aluminum, fabrication and large-scale power exposure. Its 2025 results already showed the same margin migration seen in Hydro: stronger aluminum-alloy margins and weaker alumina margins.

The most important medium-term question is not whether China can add another 10 Mt of nominal primary capacity under the current framework; it is how much additional effective supply can be created through utilization, relocation, technology and semi-finished exports.

 

Rusal adds another dimension to the same argument: technically competitive capacity can still be economically discounted if access to premium markets is constrained.

10. Rusal: low-carbon metal with a market-access discount

Rusal remains one of the world’s largest primary aluminum producers and one of the largest sources of hydro-powered, relatively low-carbon metal, making it an important part of any global cost-curve and supply-security discussion.

However, Rusal also demonstrates why headline aluminum prices do not translate equally into corporate returns. FY2025 revenue increased 22.6% to $14.81bn and aluminum sales rose 16.4% to approximately 4.49 Mt, yet the company reported a $455m net loss as cost of sales, financing expense, FX and sanctions-related commercial frictions overwhelmed higher metal prices.

Geography has changed materially: Asia represented about 52% of 2025 revenue, with China alone around 35%, while Europe declined to roughly 16%. The EU's restrictions and Western customer avoidance have reduced Rusal's access to some premium markets even though much of its Siberian production is hydro-powered and carbon-competitive. The correct analytical point is to treat Rusal as a high-quality physical-production system with an unusually large geopolitical and market-access discount.

 

Regionalization is also creating opportunities for processing hubs that do not need to become major primary producers. Turkey is a useful example.

11. Turkey: an increasingly relevant downstream bridge

  Turkey merits inclusion because it sits at the intersection of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia and has a meaningful aluminum-processing base. But it should not be presented as a primary-supply swing region comparable with China, the GCC, India or Indonesia.

Assan Alüminyum is the clearest example. The Kibar Holding subsidiary has installed annual flat-rolled capacity of up to 360kt and foil capacity of up to 130kt, making it one of Europe's two largest foil producers. It also operates recycling and renewable-power assets. Turkey therefore matters to the European downstream, foil, packaging and trade-flow discussion.

For the market outlook, Turkey is most interesting as a conversion hub: imported primary metal can be transformed into higher-value products for European and regional markets. CBAM, EU trade policy, scrap availability and power economics will determine whether that role becomes more valuable.

 

The strongest challenge to any scarcity thesis, however, comes from new primary supply. Once China is constrained at the margin, Indonesia becomes the most consequential potential source of incremental tonnes outside India.

12. Indonesia and the next supply response

A serious structural-bull case must explain where large new primary supply can still come from. After accounting for India's expansion program, Indonesia is the most consequential remaining variable outside China.

Indonesia is even more important to downside risk. The announced project pipeline is enormous and could transform the ex-China supply curve. The correct analytical stance is to discount announced nameplate capacity heavily for execution, infrastructure, financing, power and ramp-up risk — but not to ignore it. Even partial realization of the pipeline could materially reduce the scarcity premium by 2028–2030.

 

Primary expansion is only one part of the supply response. The other is scrap, which is moving from an ESG narrative into the core economics of the aluminum system.

13. Recycling is becoming a second feedstock system

Recycling should be analyzed as an industrial feedstock system, not simply a sustainability program. Hydro, EGA and Novelis are all building competitive positions around scrap collection, sorting, remelting and alloy management.

The strategic constraint is metallurgy. Scrap is chemically heterogeneous, and closed-loop systems are more valuable than generic remelt capacity. Primary metal remains necessary both because total scrap volumes are insufficient to satisfy demand growth and because virgin metal provides dilution capacity for alloy chemistry.

The likely industry architecture is therefore low-carbon primary metal + high-quality scrap + advanced sorting + alloy-specific customer loops. Companies that control both primary and secondary feedstocks should have superior flexibility through the cycle.

 

Taken together, these developments point to a different way of valuing the industry. Central assets are no longer simply a tonne of nameplate capacity, but a tonne that can remain competitive through changes in power, carbon, trade and regional premiums.

14. From metal price to capacity value

The central valuation proposition of this report is that an aluminum smelter should increasingly be valued as an industrial system, not as a collection of pots producing a commodity tonne.

Value driver

What matters economically

Why it changes valuation

Power

Cost, duration, indexation, reliability, curtailment rights

Can move an asset from first quartile to closure risk

Regional premium

Midwest / Europe / Asia exposure

Creates different realized values for the same LME tonne

Carbon intensity

Power source and verifiability

Affects CBAM, customer eligibility and premium potential

Permits & infrastructure

Land, grid, port, environmental approvals

Hard to recreate; major barrier to new capacity

Product mix

P1020 vs billet/slab/rod/specialty alloy

Adds margin and customer stickiness

Raw-material integration

Bauxite/alumina security

Reduces input volatility and supply disruption

Recycling

Scrap access and metallurgy

Creates lower-carbon feedstock and downstream optionality

Brownfield growth

Unused pots, casthouse debottlenecking, technology upgrade

Usually cheaper and faster than greenfield

Market access

Sanctions, tariffs, logistics, customer qualification

Explains why Rusal and U.S. producers can realize very different economics

 


That re-rating still needs to be separated from the unusually favorable 2026 earnings cycle. The critical analytical task is to distinguish structural advantage from temporary windfall.

15. What part of today’s earnings is sustainable?

A percentage EBITDA margin can be misleading because revenue recognition differs widely. The better primary-aluminum framework is sustainable EBITDA per tonne and a bridge from realized metal price to cash margin.

For Alcoa and Century, 2026 EBITDA/t is unusually elevated by U.S. regional premiums and should be stress-tested against normalized Midwest premiums. For Hydro and Rio Tinto, the more durable advantage lies in hydro-linked power and integrated raw materials. For EGA and Alba, power economics are strong but geopolitical and logistics exposure deserves a higher risk discount than before 2026. For Rusal, low-carbon power is attractive but market-access discounts can overwhelm part of that advantage.

For downstream companies the metric changes. Constellium's H1 EBITDA includes a large non-cash metal-price-lag benefit; Kaiser should be viewed on conversion revenue and premium end markets; Novelis should be analyzed through adjusted EBITDA/t, recycling economics, can/auto mix and ramp-up returns from Bay Minette.

The central question for any public-equity or strategic investor is therefore: how much of 2026 EBITDA survives if LME normalizes, alumina remains soft, Gulf supply recovers and regional premiums compress? The answer will vary much more by asset quality and geography than by nominal aluminum tonnes.

 

The medium-term outlook therefore depends less on a single global deficit number than on how these regional systems interact: China optimization, Indonesian and Indian growth, Gulf normalization, Western power constraints and recycling.

16. 2027–2030: a more segmented and more valuable industry

                The medium-term outlook is best framed as a competition between slower, more expensive primary-supply additions and a set of powerful supply responses from India, Indonesia, China optimization and recycling.

Scenario

Supply assumption

Demand assumption

Market outcome

Scarcity / upside

Indonesia delayed;

China cap holds;

Western restarts exhausted;

Gulf risk persists

Grid, aerospace, packaging and industrial demand strengthen

High incentive prices and persistent regional premiums;

 premium capacity re-rates

Base case

Indonesia ramps gradually;

India expands;

Gulf normalizes;

recycling grows

Moderate global growth with strong grid/electrification demand

Balanced-to-tight physical market;

high volatility;

margins above 2010s norm for best assets

Supply-response / downside

Indonesia executes rapidly;

China pushes semis exports;

full Gulf recovery

Weak manufacturing and construction

LME and premiums compress; high-cost smelters vulnerable; best downstream and lowest-cost primary outperform

 

The base case is not a straight-line aluminum price bull market. It is a structurally more segmented industry in which good assets retain scarcity value even when benchmark prices correct. Regional premiums, power security and carbon acceptability become more persistent valuation variables.

This is also why the current M&A cycle matters. Alba's $2.2bn Dunkerque acquisition, Alcoa's $4.1bn upfront South32 transaction, Tomago's A$2.5bn government support framework and the willingness to restart mothballed capacity are all manifestations of the same economic fact: creating or recreating competitive smelting capacity has become difficult enough that existing systems attract strategic capital.


 

Conclusion

The 2026 aluminum market is strong, but the strongest investment conclusion is not simply 'higher prices'. The industry is differentiating more sharply between nominal and competitive capacity.

Competitive capacity means power-secured, permitted, carbon-acceptable, logistically resilient tonnes with access to attractive regional premiums and customers. Hydro's Norwegian system, Rio's Canadian assets, Gulf smelters, U.S. scarcity exposure, Rusal's market-access discount and Indonesia's coal-powered expansion pipeline all demonstrate why the same tonne of aluminum can have radically different economic value.

China's 45 Mt framework has reduced one form of supply elasticity, but India, Indonesia, semi-fabricated exports and recycling create new forms. The late-2020s market will therefore be decided less by a single global supply-demand balance and more by the interaction of regional power, carbon, trade and capacity systems.

The implication for asset values is material. A 500–700ktpa smelter with long-duration power and established infrastructure may deserve to be analyzed against replacement cost and strategic optionality, not only against a historical commodity EBITDA multiple. That is the deeper reason behind the current acquisition, restart and government-support cycle.

Aluminum is still a cyclical commodity. But competitive aluminum capacity is increasingly becoming strategic infrastructure.


 

Selected sources

[4] Rio Tinto Tomago asset page: https://www.riotinto.com/en/operations/anz/tomago

[18] Rusal corporate disclosures: https://rusal.ru/en/

[19] Assan Alüminyum company profile: https://www.assanaluminyum.com/en/kurumsal/assan-aluminyum

[20] International Aluminium Institute production statistics: https://international-aluminium.org/statistics/primary-aluminium-production/


FX reference used for indicative USD equivalents

June 30, 2026 reference rates used for orientation: NOK1 = $0.0998027; INR1 = $0.0105968; CNY1 = $0.147096; MYR1 = $0.245489. Company-reported U.S.-dollar equivalents are used where available. FX conversions are indicative and should not be interpreted as constant-currency restatements.

 
 
 

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